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RLUIPA’S EQUAL TERMS CLAUSE AND THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: STRIKING A 







Churches are being eliminated from downtown and commercial 
areas for countless reasons. They are unpopular in residential districts 
because they allegedly create too much traffic and noise. Religious 
assemblies are excluded from downtown and commercial areas because 
they do not attract enough traffic to generate retail and tax revenues for the 
surrounding areas, and the traffic that they do draw tends to be irregular 
(e.g., only when services or religious events are scheduled.1) 
Notwithstanding the unpopular perceptions and the pushback from local 
zoning boards that religious institutions inevitably face when searching for 
a place to serve their community, these religious institutions maintain a 
First Amendment right to exist and to exercise their religion. In other words, 
churches have a First Amendment right to not only practice their religion, 
but also to have a location to do so. Churches are unable to practice this 
fundamental right if they do not have a physical space to do so. When local 
municipalities and zoning boards place restrictions on where churches can 
and cannot build, they are essentially restricting their free exercise of 
religion. Often, their freedom of how to choose how best to represent their 
congregation and to fulfill their faith is characteristically burdened by 
hostile zoning authorities regulated by a local zoning board.  
Apart from these restrictions, justifications exist as to why there is 
a zoning process in the first place. Historically, zoning originated as an 
attempt to create legislatively-fixed plans of a community.2 In more cases 
 
    * J.D., Class of 2020, Mississippi College School of Law. I am grateful for 
the thoughtful and engaging conversations with, and comments from Professor Mark 
Modak-Truran, who inspired this project and in guiding me in its development. Further 
thanks to the Mississippi College Law Review Editorial Board for continuously pushing 
me to make this Article better. 
    1. See River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Village of Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d 
367, 371 (7th Cir. 2010); Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism v. City of Long Branch, 510 
F.3d 253, 270 (3d Cir. 2007) (noting that “churches are by their nature not likely to foster 
the kind of extended-hours traffic and synergistic spending” desired in a commercial 
district). 
    2. Ashira P. Ostrow, Judicial Review of Local Land Use Decisions: Lessons 
from RLUIPA, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 717, 727 (2008) (arguing that municipalities 
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than not, local officials within municipalities exercise broad discretion to 
deny special zoning permits, excluding churches based on ambiguous 
standards such as whether the use is “consistent with the character of the 
neighborhood” or “consistent with the health, safety, and welfare of the 
community.”3 As a result, substantive planning has been replaced by 
subjective zoning decisions that disregard principal First Amendment 
rights, making it convenient for local zoning officials to disguise what 
appears to be on the surface proper zoning regulations of churches, but in 
all actuality, are arbitrary, discriminatory, or a combination of the two. This 
tension raises the question of what the appropriate balance between 
religious freedom is and a community’s ability to regulate land use. In 
efforts to answer this question, Congress enacted the Religious Land Use 
and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), which prohibits the 
government from implementing a land-use regulation in a manner that 
treats religious assemblies and institutions less favorably than secular 
assemblies and institutions.4  
This Comment does not argue for a particular interpretation of 
religious exercise under RLUIPA. Rather, it reviews how three different 
circuit courts have interpreted the equal terms provision, specifically 
analyzing how these courts are dealing with the tension between 
commercial land use regulations and religious land use regulations. The 
Eleventh Circuit interprets the provision textually, finding a violation when 
a city treats any type of religious land use with any assembly or institution 
on less than equal terms.5 The Third and Seventh Circuits both use a 
“similarly situated” test, though each circuit’s test differs slightly. The 
similarly situated requirement forces a religious assembly to demonstrate 
that it was treated on less-than-equal terms compared to a similar or 
comparable assembly.6 
 
zone individual parcels of land on a highly discretionary, case-by-case basis (“The 
absence of substantive planning means that zoning officials, who often lack training or 
planning expertise, have no objective guidelines against which to measure individual 
zoning requests. . . . This combination of factors leaves ample room for inconsistency 
and corruption in the zoning process.”)). 
     3. Douglas Laycock & Luke W. Goodrich, RLUIPA: Necessary, Modest, and 
Under-Enforced, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1021, 1022 (2012). 
     4. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 2000cc-2000cc(5) (2006). 
     5. See Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1229-35 
(11th Cir. 2004). 
    6. Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253, 257 
(3d Cir. 2007). 
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This Article is divided into three parts. Part I discusses the 
development of the conflict between churches and zoning authorities 
regarding the Supreme Court’s free exercise doctrine that led to the 
enactment of RLUIPA and briefly describes the mechanics of the equal 
terms provision. Part II describes the circuit split concerning the proper 
interpretation of the equal terms provision and explains the tests put forth 
by the Eleventh, Third, and Seventh Circuits. Part III examines each 
jurisdiction’s interpretation of their application of RLUIPA, defining how 
each jurisdiction appears to deal with this tension, and will analyze which 
interpretations appear to be most protective of religious land use and which 
appear to be the least protective. This Comment argues that the Third and 
Seventh Circuit fail to reconcile the purpose of RLUIPA, weighing 
commercial interests within municipalities higher than religious liberty. 
Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation of RLUIPA’s equal terms 
provision strikes a reasonable balance between religious assemblies and 
commercial districts within municipalities in the zoning context.  
 
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF RLUIPA AND HOW IT BECAME THE LAW 
 
This part begins with a brief explanation of the history of zoning 
and land use laws. Next, this section will summarize the events and 
legislative history leading up to RLUIPA’s enactment and then briefly 
describe its substantive provisions and the structure of RLUIPA’s land-use 
provisions. It will then explain the conflicts that have occurred between 
churches and city zoning officials in terms of land use regulation that 
further developed the need for RLUIPA.  
 
A. An Introduction to the Zoning Conflict 
 
Conflict between municipalities and religious institutions based on 
land use issues have not always been a topic of concern. The intentions of 
early city planners were to separate residential districts from commercial 
and industrial areas in order to stabilize neighborhoods and protect property 
values.7 Zoning is an extension of the concept of public nuisance,8 which is 
defined as “an unreasonable interference with a right common to the general 
public, such as a condition dangerous to health, offensive to community 
 
    7. See J. Gregory Richards, Zoning for Direct Social Control, 1982 DUKE L.J. 
761, 762 (1982). 
     8. Thomas E. Raccuia, RLUIPA and Exclusionary Zoning: Government 
Defendants Should Have the Burden of Persuasion in Equal Terms Cases, 80 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 1853,1858 (2012). 
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moral standards, or unlawfully obstructing the public in the free use of 
public property.”9 The idea is that some uses of land are inherently injurious 
to other uses and should be separated.10 For instance, a city might restrict 
one area to industrial land uses while restricting another area to commercial 
land uses and another to residential uses.11 However, by the end of the 
nineteenth century, local governments became increasingly more 
concerned about the compatibility of land uses within municipalities.12 The 
first modern comprehensive zoning code was enacted in New York City in 
1916,13 and not long after that, the Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of zoning in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty.14  
In its landmark decision in Euclid, the Supreme Court confirmed 
the validity of zoning as a proper exercise of the State’s police power,15 thus 
establishing the act of zoning as the primary means of land use regulation 
in the United States. The Supreme Court held that a zoning ordinance 
violates due process only if it is “clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having 
no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general 
welfare.”16 Following the Euclid decision, churches became more 
intertwined with land use regulations and zoning ordinances.17 Some 
zoning regulations protected churches, keeping out places such as saloons 
from locating near religious institutions.18 As parishioners moved to 
suburbs, so did churches, and between 1937 and 1948, religious 
construction in the United States substantially increased.19 As a result, cities 
began zoning them out of certain areas, reasoning that they intruded on their 
peace and quiet.20 As the conflict of “Euclidean Zoning”21 became more 
 
     9. Public Nuisance, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
   10. Raccuia, supra note 8, at 1858. 
   11. Id. 
   12. Ashira P. Ostrow, Judicial Review of Local Land Use Decisions: Lessons 
from RLUIPA, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 717, 728 (2008). 
   13. Raccuia, supra note 8, at 1859. 
   14. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
   15. Id. at 390. 
   16. Id. at 395. 
   17. Danielle Acker Susanj, RLUIPA’s Equal Terms Clause and the Circuit 
Split: It’s All About the Money, 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2209989. 
   18. Susanj, supra note 17; See JAMES E. CURRY, PUBLIC REGULATION OF THE 
RELIGIOUS USE OF LAND: A DETAILED AND CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF A HUNDRED COURT 
CASES 3 (1964) (discussing Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.). 
   19. Susanj, supra note 17, at 3; See CURRY, note 18 (noting how churches were 
protected from certain types of uses). 
   20. Susanj, supra note 17, at 3. 
  21. Ostrow, supra note 12, at 732. 
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prevalent in the land use regulation context, the conflict between religious 
institutions and local governments became a concern, and the need for 
legislation became apparent.  
 
B. Congress Struggles with Free Exercise Jurisprudence 
 
Freedom of religion is one of the most notable and significant rights 
in the United States. The First Amendment states that, “Congress shall 
make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof . . . .”22 In the almost twenty years since Congress has 
enacted RLUIPA, the struggle between Congress and the Court to 
determine the extent to which religious liberties were protected from 
governmental action has proved to be tumultuous, controversial, and has 
been constantly challenged. A rift has developed between the Supreme 
Court and Congress on how to consistently interpret the right to Free 
Exercise in regard to the lack of protection for religious freedom.  
Until 1990, under Sherbert v. Verner,23 courts evaluated Free 
Exercise claims under the “compelling state interest” test which provided 
that, when a governmental action or regulation imposed a significant 
burden on a sincerely-held religious belief, that governmental action was 
unconstitutional as against the religious institution or practitioner unless it 
was the “least restrictive” means of furthering a “compelling governmental 
interest,” also known as strict scrutiny.24 In 1990, in Employment Division 
v. Smith,25 the Supreme Court rejected Sherbert’s strict scrutiny test when 
it upheld as constitutional an Oregon state law that prohibited the use of a 
hallucinogenic substance known as peyote in religious practice, even 
though peyote was frequently used in Native American religious 
practices.26 According to the Court in Smith, so long as a state law was 
 
  22. U.S. CONST. AMEND. I. 
   23. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). The Court held that South 
Carolina could not constitutionally apply its eligibility restrictions for unemployment 
compensation to deny benefits to a Seventh-Day Adventist who refused work on 
Saturday because of her religion. Id. at 410. 
   24. Id. at 406-09. 
   25. Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990). The Court held 
constitutional an Oregon law prohibiting the knowing or intentional possession of a 
“controlled substance,” which included peyote. The two Native Americans contended 
that the law infringed on their religious liberty because they used peyote as part of their 
religious ceremonies as members of the Native American Church. The Supreme Court 
held that the Oregon law did not target religious beliefs but was neutral and generally 
applicable. 
   26. Id. at 874. 
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neutral and generally applicable, religious observers were required to 
comply with the law.27 
Congress expressed its disagreement with the Court’s decision in 
Smith when it passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 
(RFRA).28 Congress’s express purpose in enacting the law was to overturn 
Smith and to “restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. 
Verner,”29 effectively attempting to rewrite what was constitutionally 
enforced in previous Supreme Court cases. Congress enacted and enforced 
RFRA against the states by relying on its enforcement powers under 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.30 The Fourteenth Amendment 
prohibits states from making or enforcing laws that (1) “abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States” (2) “deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,” nor (3) 
“deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws.”31 Section 5 of the Amendment gives Congress the power to enforce 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s provisions “by appropriate legislation.”32 
Only four years after Congress enacted RFRA, the Supreme Court 
struck down RFRA as it applied to the states in City of Boerne v. Flores33 
 
   27. Id. at 878-82. (“We have never held that an individual’s religious beliefs 
excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the 
State is free to regulate.”) 
   28. 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1994). RFRA provides that, “Government shall not 
substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule 
of general applicability, except as provided in subsection (b).” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a). 
Subsection (b) then maintains that a substantial burden of a person’s exercise of religion 
is applicable if the burden furthers a compelling governmental interest and is the least 
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. 
   29. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (explaining that the purposes of the Act are to 
restore the compelling interest test in Sherbert and “to guarantee its application in all 
cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened”). 
  30. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 516–17 (1997) (describing RFRA’s 
application to state and local governments: “[t]he Act’s mandate applies to any ‘branch, 
department, agency, instrumentality, and official (or other person acting under color of 
law) of the United States,’ as well as to any ‘State or . . . subdivision of a State.’”). 
   31. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
   32. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV., § 5; See Sarah Keeton Campbell, Restoring 
RLUIPA’s Equal Terms Provision, 58 DUKE L.J. 1071, 1078 (2009); See also ERWIN 
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPALS AND POLICIES 292–93 (3d ed. 2006) 
(explaining that Congress can only regulate state and local governments under its Section 
5 power). 
   33. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. 507. City of Boerne involved a church that was 
attempting to expand their congregation. The church was denied a zoning permit by local 
zoning authorities on the basis of a local zoning ordinance that had recently been passed. 
The ordinance authorized the city’s Historic Landmark Commission to prepare a 
preservation plan with historic landmarks and districts. As a result, the commission was 
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on the basis that Congress had acted beyond the scope of its Section 5 
powers to regulate the states.34 City of Boerne was a zoning case where a 
Catholic Archbishop was denied a request for a building permit by local 
zoning authorities who argued that the church was part of a historic 
district.35 The church sued under RFRA arguing that its congregation had 
outgrown their current church, and the ruling was a substantial burden on 
their free exercise of religion and did not contain a compelling state 
interest.36 The issue in the case was whether Congress had exceeded its 
enforcement power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment37 by 
enacting RFRA.38 The Court explained that Congress’s power under 
Section 5 was remedial and prevented unconstitutional actions.39 
Notwithstanding this remedial power, RFRA was not considered a 
“remedial, preventive legislation” that was intended to address the free 
exercise of religious liberty violations committed by the states.40 According 
to the Court, if Congress chooses to have remedial power to enforce and 
protect religious liberty by regulating the states under Section 5, then the 
legislation had to show “congruence and proportionality” in accordance to 
the violations and how it would attempt to correct those violations.41 
Because RFRA was not remedial and did not meet the “congruence and 
proportionality” test, RFRA was disproportionate and was deemed 
unconstitutional as applied to the states.42 Despite this holding, RFRA 
continues to be controlling as to the federal government. 
 
required to preapprove construction affecting historic landmarks or buildings in a historic 
district. 
   34. Id. at 519 (“[A]s broad as the congressional enforcement power is, it is not 
unlimited. Legislation which alters the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause cannot be 
said to be enforcing the Clause. Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by 
changing what the right is. It has been given the power ‘to enforce,’ not the power to 
determine what constitutes a constitutional violation.”). 
   35. Id. at 511–12. 
   36. Id. 
  37. U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV § 5. This section provides, “The Congress shall 
have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.” 
   38. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 517. 
   39. Id. at 519. 
   40. Id. at 532. Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court, explaining that, “RFRA is 
so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that it cannot be 
understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior. It appears, 
instead, to attempt a substantive change in constitutional protections.” 
   41. Id. at 520. 
  42. Id. at 530–32 (further explaining the congruence and proportionality test). 
Justice Kennedy contended that, “while preventive rules are sometimes appropriate 
remedial measures, there must be a congruence between the means used and the ends to 
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After the Court’s landmark decision in Boerne, it was clear that the 
decision in Smith would not be overturned. Further, Congress’s attempt to 
broadly define constitutional standards by creating RFRA was essentially 
an attempt to alter constitutional rights, rather than by simply enforcing a 
constitutional right.43 However, unsurprisingly, Congress did not accept the 
Court’s decision and shifted its attention to drafting a redefined statute that 
protected religious liberties while simultaneously meeting the Court’s 
approval. 
 
C. Take Two: Congress Passes RLUIPA 
 
Just three weeks after the Court invalidated the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act in Boerne, Congress began to work on legislation “to 
enhance the level of protection afforded to religious freedom.”44 The House 
of Representative’s Subcommittee held a series of hearings to reevaluate 
and assess the need to protect religious freedom. These hearings led to the 
introduction of various bills, one of which included the Religious Liberty 
Protection Act of 1999 ("RLPA”) and the eventual passage of RLUIPA. 45  
Similar to RFRA, RLPA attempted to reenact RFRA by once again 
introducing strict scrutiny for state laws that burdened religious exercise. 
But this time Congress attempted to use its Article I powers rather than its 
Section 5 powers to do so.46 Despite passing in the House, RLPA was 
delayed in the Senate which forced Congress to abandon strict scrutiny as 
the test for all laws that burdened religious freedom.47  
Continued lobbying focused primarily on protection in two 
particular areas: religious land use privileges and religious expression for 
institutionalized persons. As a result, eventually led to RLPA’s evolution 
into the more narrow and focused Religious Land Use and Institutionalized 
 
be achieved. The appropriateness of remedial measures must be considered in light of the 
evil presented.” 
   43. Id. at 535–36. 
   44. Michael Paisner, Boerne Supremacy: Congressional Responses to City of 
Boerne v. Flores and the Scope of Congress’s Article I Powers, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 537, 
541 (2005). 
   45. See H.R. REP. NO. 106-219 (1999). 
  46. See Marci A. Hamilton, Federalism and the Public Good: The True Story 
Behind the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 78 IND. L.J. 311, 333-
34 (2003) (explaining the development of religious liberty bills eventually leading to the 
passage of RLUIPA). 
   47. Sean Foley, RLUIPA’s Equal-Terms Provision’s Troubling Definition of 
Equal: Why the Equal-Terms Provision Must Be Interpreted Narrowly, 60 KAN. L. REV. 
193, 199 (2012). 
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Persons Act (“RLUIPA”).48 RLUIPA prohibits the government from 
implementing a land use regulation in a manner that treats religious 
assemblies and institutions less than favorably than secular assemblies and 
institutions.49 Prior to the enactment of RLUIPA, Congress held nine 
hearings over a three-year period and compiled extensive and widespread 
evidence of religious discrimination in the land use context.50 Congress 
determined that land use regulations lacked objective, generally applicable 
standards, leaving zoning officials with infinite discretion in determining 
whether to deny or grant zoning requests.51 As a result, RLUIPA passed 
with unanimous bipartisan consent and was signed into law by President 
Clinton on September 22, 2000.52  
 
1. The Equal Terms Provision in Context 
 
RLUIPA’s land-use section protects individuals, religious 
assemblies, and religious institutions against two main categories of 
government action. One category provides that RLUIPA prohibits land-use 
regulations that substantially burden religious liberty, also known as the 
substantial burden provision.53 The second category directly addresses 
discrimination.54 One subsection provides that a jurisdiction cannot treat a 
religious assembly or institution on less than equal terms with a secular 
assembly or institution,55 and it cannot discriminate against an assembly or 
institution based on religious denomination.56 Another subsection directly 
addresses exclusion, providing that land-use regulation may not totally 
 
   48. Foley supra note 50; See Hamilton supra note 49, at 334 (detailing 
lobbying efforts that ultimately caused the development of RLPA into RLUIPA). 
   49. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 2000cc-2000cc(5) (2006). 
   50. 146 CONG. REC. S7774 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of 
Senators Hatch and Kennedy). 
   51. See H.R. REP. NO. 106-219. (1999). 
  52. See Bill Summary & Status 106th Congress (1999-2000) S.2869, 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/106th-congress/senate-bill/2869. 
   53. RLUIPA’s substantial burden provision is a type of religious exemption, 
stating that if a land-use regulation substantially burdens the free exercise of religion, the 
government must show that the burden serves a compelling interest and is the least 
restrictive means. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1) (2006). 
   54. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b). (“No government shall impose or implement a land 
use regulation that discriminates against any assembly or institution on the basis of 
religion or religious denomination.”) 
   55. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1). 
   56. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(2). 
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exclude religious assemblies or unreasonably limit religious assemblies, 
institutions, or structures within a jurisdiction. 57  
The equal terms provision section is conceptually distinct from the 
first section’s substantial burden provision in that it “rest[s] on claims of 
religious equality, not privilege.”58 In other words, while the substantial 
burden provision ensures religious privilege by prohibiting the government 
from placing substantial burdens on religious exercise, the equal terms 
provision reflects an “alternative jurisprudential understanding of religious 
liberty” by requiring equality of treatment and not privileged treatment.59 
In contrast to the substantial burden provision, the text of the equal terms 
provision does not require that the unequal treatment substantially burdens 
religious exercise to prove an RLUIPA violation. Additionally, the explicit 
terms of the equal terms provision completely prohibits unequal treatment. 
Where the substantial burden provision explicitly provides that substantial 
burdens on religion are prohibited unless they survive the compelling 
interest test, the equal terms provision prohibits all unequal treatment.  
To summarize, the first category and the second category are 
inherently distinct from one another. The plain terms of the equal terms 
provision prohibit any land-use regulation that treats a religious assembly 
or institution on less than equal terms with a secular assembly or institution. 
Nowhere in the statute does the text indicate that Congress intended to 
apply the substantial burden requirement or the compelling interest test 
from the first category. 
Much of the debate over the proper interpretation of RLUIPA’s 
land-use provisions has centered around the Act’s substantial burden 
section and equal terms provision. Yet, in almost two decades since its 
passage, and after substantial consideration amongst seven different circuit 
courts, both provisions still remain unclear. There has been confusion 
amongst the lower courts on how to interpret the equal terms provision and 
to what extent the substantial burden category should be applied to the equal 
terms provision. However, this Comment will focus on the lower courts’ 
interpretations of the equal terms provision only. Uncertainty regarding the 
courts’ understanding of the equal terms provision has resulted in 






   57. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(3)(A). 
  58. Campbell, supra note 35, at 1084. 
  59. Id. 
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D. The Conflicts That Led to the Need for RLUIPA 
 
1. Religious and Racial Hostility in the Zoning Context 
 
Discrimination against religion is one reason why some churches 
are unpopular and unwelcomed, and there are many cases that maintain that 
religious discrimination continues to be significant. At the same time, the 
intent to discriminate is difficult to prove and is easy to mask. More often 
than not, resistance is phrased in unsubstantiated concerns about traffic, 
parking, noise, or property values.60 Another way officials can reject 
churches is by requiring churches to obtain a special-use permit which is 
often subject to ambiguous conditions or left to the broad discretion of local 
officials.61 Or these elusive zoning ordinances can refuse religious 
institutions on the basis of ill-defined concerns about the “character of the 
neighborhood” or “general welfare.”62 Another problematic concern is that 
any of the conflicts mentioned above between religious institutions and 
local municipalities could serve as pretext in which a city or zoning official 
offers what they consider to be a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for 
the conflict that is actually just discrimination against a church.  
A very relevant and recent example is the pervasive hostility and 
discrimination that Muslim Americans face. More specifically, hostility 
towards Muslim mosques. A 2016 Detroit News report found that, while 
Muslim groups represented 14% of RLUIPA cases prior to 2010, they make 
up 44% of cases since that time.63 In October 2015, the Justice Department 
filed a lawsuit against Pittsfield Township in Detroit for failing to approve 
a zoning request for an Islamic school, accusing the township of violating 
the religious land use act.64 The township was accused of violating the law 
when it denied zoning approval to allow the Michigan Islamic Academy 
(MIA) to build a school on a vacant part of land.65 The group ran a school 
 
   60. Laycock & Goodrich, supra note 3, at 1026; See Adam J. MacLeod, A 
Non-Fatal Collision: Interpreting RLUIPA Where Religious Land Uses and Community 
Interests Meet, 42 URB. LAW 41, 129 (2010) (“A municipality that has provided a 
plausible rationale for its decision is far less likely to have acted in a discriminatory 
manner than one that provides no reasons, or that gives an arbitrary or irrational 
justification. The arbitrariness or opaqueness of a land use decision can serve as a signal 
that discrimination lurks below the surface.”). 
  61. Laycock & Goodrich, supra note 3, at 1028-29; See Susanj supra note 17. 
   62. Laycock & Goodrich, supra note 3, at 1028-29. 
   63. Jennifer Chambers, Feds Target Religious Bias in Zoning Fights (May 24, 
2016), https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/michigan/2016/05/24/feds-target-
religious-bias-zoning-fights/84881958/. 
   64. Id. 
   65. Id. 
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in Ann Arbor and sought to build in Pittsfield Township because it had 
outgrown its current location.66 In 2016, the Justice Department settled with 
Pittsfield Charter Township.67 As part of the settlement, the Township 
agreed to permit MIA to build a school on the vacant parcel of land, to treat 
the school and all other religious groups equally, and to publicize its non-
discrimination policies and practices.68 Other minority faiths have also 
faced a disproportionate share of hostility including Sikhs, Buddhists, 
Brazilian-based religions, as well as majority faiths such as Christians who 
occasionally draw hostile reactions because they are unpopular with their 
political opponents.69  
 
2. Fiscal Costs and Taxes in Commercial Districts 
 
Churches also face hostility because many municipalities want to 
attract and incentivize revenue-generating entities rather than tax-exempt 
non-profits.70 As a result, the presence of churches may hurt these 
municipalities financially. Some critics of RLUIPA have argued that tax 
revenue is a legitimate and a compelling land-use interest.71 Still, if this 
were really the case, it would require less work to exclude any new religious 
institutions from developing. Existing churches would be grandfathered in, 
and this would prevent any new church from ever having the opportunity 
to be created.72 One noteworthy court decision rejected a city’s argument 
that “revenue generation” (having a Costco store on the church’s property) 
was a compelling interest. The court observed that “if revenue generation 
were a compelling state interest, municipalities could exclude all religious 
institutions from their cities.”73 One participant in a Department of Justice 
listening session told government officials that religious land use was just 
not viewed as a critical part of the discussion about zoning and municipal 
 
  66. Id. 
  67. Department of Justice, Justice Department and Pittsfield Charter Township 
Resolve Lawsuit Over Denial of Zoning Approval for Islamic School (September 29, 
2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-and-pittsfield-charter-
township-resolve-lawsuit-over-denial-zoning. 
   68. Id. 
   69. Laycock & Goodrich, supra note 3, at 1028-29 (providing numerous cases 
dealing with hostility towards minority faiths in the zoning context). 
   70. Department of Justice, Combating Religious Discrimination Today: Final 
Report, (July 2016), https://www.justice.gov/crt/file/884181/download. 
   71. Laycock & Goodrich, supra note 3, at 1036. 
  72. Id. 
  73. Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v. Cypress Redevelopment Agency, 218 F. 
Supp. 2d 1203, 1228 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 
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planning.74 However, participants noted that even in situations where local 
leaders did not maintain any hostility towards religious institutions, the 
result was still the same—religious congregations were faced with unfair 
and unjust land use restrictions.  
Churches also face hostility in commercial or entertainment 
districts. Common complaints deal with the fact that churches who 
encroach on commercial or entertainment districts ultimately 
inconvenience the community. Additionally, some common complaints are 
that religious institutions do not attract enough people at the proper hours. 
Or, churches do not draw in interested shoppers which could harm the 
surrounding shopping areas rather than aiding in drawing consumer traffic 
like a business in the same location would. Another issue is that, 
notwithstanding the lack of revenue, communities do not want churches 
there because of the traffic—people do not want to be inconvenienced (even 
if it means being inconvenienced only on Sunday or possibly even 
Wednesday). Two circuits have upheld the exclusion of churches based on 
commercial concerns.75  
On the other hand, churches do contribute to cities’ economic 
welfare, rather than harming it, which seems to be the common theme 
surrounding religious land use in the zoning context. Some local 
government officials view churches in a positive light, noting that they offer 
services that taxpayers might not fund.76 For instance, if a city or 
neighborhood is struggling to fill commercial districts, the presence and 
activity of a church could potentially be a benefit. This is in part due to the 
fact that a church building generates the same amount of tax revenue for 
the city as an empty building would, as well as the presence and activity of 
people outside regular business hours deters crimes and other adverse 
activities.77 Nevertheless, the question still remains as to whether RLUIPA 
helps rather than hinders the issue of whether or not churches are permitted 
to locate where secular places of assembly can locate. More specifically, 




   74. Department of Justice, supra note 70 (The participant went on to say, “I’ve 
looked at 40 comprehensive plans. Nobody is sitting out there and saying, ‘You know 
what’s really important in our community, the religious land use needs.’”). 
   75. See River of Life, 611 F.3d 367; See also Lighthouse Inst., 510 F.3d at 253. 
   76. Susanj, supra note 17, at 8-10. 
  77. See JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 44-
45, 98-99 (1993) (noting that mixed zoning uses encourage people to be present at 
different times, increasing safety and economic benefits to enterprises looking for 
consumers). 
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3. NIMBY Opposition 
 
In addition to economic hostility and racial discrimination against 
churches, churches are often subject to Not in My Backyard (“NIMBY”) 
challenges. NIMBY is a characterization of resistance by residents to a 
proposed development in their local area.78 NIMBY often carries the 
implication that residents are opposing the development because it is too 
close to them, and that they would likely support it if it were built farther 
away. These nearby residents often express concerns regarding parking and 
traffic issues, aesthetics, maintaining agricultural land, loss of space in 
general, a decrease in property values, or the welfare of its residents.79  
Although many land uses face NIMBY oppositions, religious 
activities in particular bring with it unique side effects that neighboring land 
users do not support. Typically, people do not raise opposition to a new 
grocery store, a Target, or a new gym being built because residents gain 
some benefit from these developments, and these developments create an 
additional convenience to their lives. There will be employment 
opportunities as a result of these new developments, and the city will gain 
tax revenue from it. But more likely than not, residents are not going to 
have any interest in attending a new church. Some already have roots in a 
church and some people have no interest in going to church in the first 
place. They gain no benefit from seeing a new church being built. In 
contrast, a grocery store, department store, or new gym are certainly going 
to attract the same size, if not more people than a church. Yet, these types 
of crowds differ because they occur on different days and at different hours. 
In other words, while a church might attract the same size crowd as these 
other buildings, it could be argued that this crowd is probably its entire 
group of supporters, and these groups only come together on a specific day 
during certain hours.  
According to a 2018 Gallup poll, 50% of Americans said they were 
a member of a church or synagogue; however, only about 22% of 
Americans attended church or synagogue every week.80 Furthermore, 
 
   78. Susanj, supra note 17, at 11-13. 
  79. Rocky Mountain Christian Church v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of Boulder 
County, 613 F.3d 1229 (10th Cir. 2010). In this case, the county rejected an Evangelical 
Christian church from expanding its campus in a rural part of Boulder County, citing 
concerns about increased traffic, loss of open space, and the welfare of its residents. 
   80. Gallup Poll, Topics on Religion, 
https://news.gallup.com/poll/1690/religion.aspx (last visited Dec. 20, 2019) (providing 
an exhaustive list of statistics regarding religion in America). Interestingly enough, even 
though 50% of Americans stated they were a member of a church or synagogue, when 
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worshipers who regularly attend church are divided among people with 
different denominations, so any new church can only expect to serve only 
a small part of the population of wherever it chooses to go. So, for the 
majority of residents, any cost that a new church does generate exceeds the 
expected benefit.81  
As Doug Laycock points out, deference to NIMBY objections 
creates problematic policy concerns.82 One argument is that by enabling 
neighbors veto power over the location of churches, their constitutional 
rights are being subjected to “the standardless whim of neighbors who are 
under no obligation to adhere to any rules or to give any weigh whatsoever 
to the free exercise of religion.”83 Another reason is that if NIMBY 
objections are always a genuine basis for excluding churches, then it is 
possible that churches would always be excluded. Lastly, considering the 
fact that there is so much discretion in the zoning process to begin with, it 
is extremely difficult to tell when NIMBY complaints are authentic, “when 
they are exaggerated expressions of opposition to all new development, and 
when they are pretext for anti-religious animus.”84 This results in any 
opposition to churches being easily masked by city officials who argue 
some form of economic concern they have for their town, but in reality, 
these concerns often serve as pretext for hostile and unequal treatment of 
churches.85 
On the other hand, NIMBY should be defended—but within reason 
and with limitations. Cities should still be able to impose reasonable land 
use regulations as long as they do not overreach and to ensure that churches 
have equal opportunity to be located within that jurisdiction. It is obvious 
that city officials often take advantage of how easy it is to defend their 
opposition to churches moving into their towns through some sort of 
NIMBY objection. Nevertheless, while there should be some pushback 
against NIMBY, NIMBY serves as an example of property owners 
exercising their constitutional rights. It is a stretch to argue that if all 
NIMBY objections were always accepted, then all churches would be 
excluded.  
The belief that secondary effects generated by churches are 
burdensome to its residents is not unfounded. Neighbors use NIMBY to 
 
asked whether or not they happened to attend church or synagogue in the last days, only 
32% said they had. 
   81. Laycock & Goodrich, supra note 3, at 1032. 
   82. Laycock & Goodrich, supra note 3, at 1032-1035. 
  83. Laycock & Goodrich, supra note 3, at 1035. 
   84. Id. 
  85. Id. 
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voice their constitutional rights to express legitimate concerns that their 
property value will be negatively affected by the creation of a building and 
parking lot in their neighborhood. While NIMBY objections should be 
carefully analyzed, this does not mean that residents’ property rights should 
take a backseat at the expense of a church trying to follow through with 
their religious agenda. This does not mean that cities can completely zone 
out all religious institutions. It just means that cities should be given a 
reasonable amount of deference to NIMBY objections and should have a 
reasonable amount of power to place restrictions on when religious 
institutions choose to occupy certain land, so long as they can prove beyond 
a surface level explanation as to why zoning out a church is necessary.  
Regardless of either position, this raises the question of whether or 
not there can be a proper balance between religious institutions’ uses and 
neighbors’ interests. Further, how far can residents go with their NIMBY 
objections? It could easily be argued that the problem with NIMBY 
objections is that anywhere that a church chooses to reside is going to be 
someone’s backyard. Notwithstanding these potential concerns, both 
residents and churches have a First Amendment right to exist. Churches 
have the First Amendment right to exercise their religion and to have a 
physical space in which to exercise this religion. Residents have the 
constitutional right to exercise legitimate concerns dealing with their 
property. 
 
III. THE CIRCUIT COURTS’ SPLIT IN RLUIPA EQUAL TERMS CASES 
 
A. The Eleventh Circuit 
 
The Eleventh Circuit became the first circuit to decide one of the 
major equal terms cases. The Eleventh Circuit test for determining whether 
or not there has been an RLUIPA violation states that “a plaintiff has the 
burden of showing the following elements: ‘(1) the plaintiff must be a 
religious assembly or institution, (2) subject to a land use regulation, that 
(3) treats the religious assembly on less than equal terms, with (4) a 
nonreligious assembly or institution.’”86 If the plaintiff makes this prima 
facie showing, then the government has the burden of proving that its action 
passes the strict scrutiny test.87 
 
   86. Covenant Christian Ministries, Inc. v. City of Marietta, 654 F.3d 1231, 
1245 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Primera Iglesia Bautista Hispana, Inc. v. Broward County, 
450 F.3d 1295, 1307-08 (11th Cir. 2006)). 
   87. Id. 
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In Midrash Sephardi v. Inc. Town of Surfside,88 two small Jewish 
Orthodox congregations in a town north of Miami Beach89 leased property 
within Surfside’s business district.90 Surfside’s business district permitted 
theaters, restaurants, private clubs, lodge halls, health clubs, dance studios, 
and a variety of different schools; however, churches and synagogues were 
prohibited. 91 While the two synagogues leased space in the area zoned for 
business, only one applied for a special-use permit to use the space for 
religious purposes.92 The city denied the application, arguing that allowing 
churches and synagogues in the business district would “erode Surfside’s 
tax base” and would result in economic hardship on the residents.93 The city 
went on to argue that churches and synagogues contribute “little synergy to 
retail shopping areas and disrupt the continuity of retail environments.”94  
The Eleventh Circuit held that Surfside’s zoning ordinance allowing 
secular assemblies such as private clubs and lodge halls, but excluding 
churches and synagogues, violated the equal terms provision.95 When 
analyzing and interpreting the “similarly situated” aspect of RLUIPA, the 
court adopted a textual interpretation and defined “assembly” and 
“institution” in their ordinary meanings, relying on Webster and Black’s 
Law Dictionary.96 The court defined “assembly” as either “a company of 
persons collected together in one place and usually for some common 
purpose (as deliberation and legislation, worship, or social 
entertainment)”97 or “[a] group of persons organized and united for some 
common purpose.”98 The court further defined “institution” as “an 
established society or corporation: an establishment or foundation 
 
   88. Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 
2004). 
   89. Id. at 1219. Surfside is a small coastal town north of Miami Beach and 
south of Bal Harbour, Florida, comprising about one square mile and has 4,300 residents 
and an estimated tourist population of 2,030. 
   90. Id. at 1220. 
  91. Id. 
   92. Id. at 1220-21. 
   93. Id. at 1222. 
   94. Id. 
   95. Id. at 1219 (“We first hold that the SZO’s provision excluding churches 
and synagogues from locations where private clubs and lodges are permitted violates the 
equal terms provision of RLUIPA.”). 
   96. Id. at 1230. 
   97. Id. (quoting WEBSTER’S 3D NEW INT’L UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 131 
(1993)). 
  98. Id. (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 801 (7th ed. 1999)). 
190 MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW [VOL. 38:2 
 
especially of a public character”99 or “an established organization, 
especially one of a public character . . . .”100  
The court held that synagogues and private clubs both fell within 
the natural perimeters of “assembly” and “institution.”101 The court 
reasoned that churches and synagogues fell within this “natural perimeter 
of ‘assembly or institution,’ because churches and synagogues shared 
similar purposes to places like private clubs where “social, educational, 
recreational . . . can meet together to pursue their interests.”102  The court 
declined to adopt the similarly situated requirement it identified in its 
analysis on the Equal Protection Clause.103 The Midrash Sephardi court 
rejected the similarly situated requirement on the ground that "[t]he relevant 
‘natural perimeter’ for consideration with respect to RLUIPA’s prohibition 
is the category of ‘assemblies or institutions,’” and further, that the “express 
provisions of RLUIPA . . . require a direct and narrow focus.”104 Despite 
the fact that the equal terms provision “has the ‘feel’ of an equal protection 
law, it lacks the ‘similarly situated’ requirement usually found in equal 
protection analysis.”105 Because Surfside permitted private clubs and lodge 
halls in the business district while excluding churches and synagogues, the 
city had violated the equal terms provision of RLUIPA.106 
In terms of the appropriate level of scrutiny, the Midrash court 
explained that the equal terms provision in RLUIPA codified the Smith107 
and Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah108 rulings. Under this line 
of precedent, the court explained that “[a] zoning law is not neutral or 
generally applicable if it treats similarly situated secular and religious 
assemblies differently . . . .”109 Thus, laws violating the equal terms 
provision are subject to strict scrutiny.110 The court went on to conclude 
that Surfside’s zoning ordinance was not narrowly tailored to further 
 
   99. Id. (quoting WEBSTER’S 3D NEW INT’L UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1171 
(1993)). 
 100. Id. at 1230-31 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 801 (7th ed. 1999)). 
 101. Id. at 1230-31. 
 102. Id. at 1231. 
 103. Id. at 1230 (discussing the similarly situated requirement the district court 
adopted and why the district court erred in doing so). 
 104. Id. 
105. Id. at 1229. 
 106. Id. at 1231. 
 107. Employment Div. Dep’t. of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 
(1990). 
 108. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 
(1992). 
 109. Id. at 1232. 
 110. Id at 1235. 
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advance the “proffered interests of retail synergy.”111 The city essentially 
excluded religious assemblies that did not serve an economic purpose while 
simultaneously permitting secular assemblies despite the fact that the 
secular assemblies “endanger[ed] Surfside’s interest in retail synergy as 
much or more than churches and synagogues.”112 
 
B. The Third Circuit 
 
The Third Circuit rejected the Eleventh Circuit’s approach in 
Lighthouse Institute for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch based on 
a “similarly situated requirement.” Lighthouse Institute for Evangelism 
purchased property in a district that was subjected to the City of Long 
Branch Ordinance.113 The city ordinance permitted many uses within the 
district, including restaurants, assembly halls, bowling alleys, movie 
theaters, educational services, and colleges; however, churches were not 
listed as a permitted use.114 Lighthouse applied for a zoning permit to use 
the property for religious purposes, but the city denied the application 
because the city did not permit churches in the commercial district.115 In 
response to this, Lighthouse filed suit against the city alleging constitutional 
violations and claiming that the ordinance violated RLUIPA.116  
While the litigation on the ordinance was pending, Long Branch 
changed its zoning ordinance and adopted a redevelopment plan “in order 
to achieve redevelopment of an underdeveloped and underutilized segment 
of the City.”117 The goals of the redevelopment plan included: bolstering 
retail trade, city revenues, and employment opportunities and 
“’[a]ttract[ing] more retail and service enterprises’ in order to boost a 
“’vibrant’ and ‘vital’ downtown residential community.”118 The 
redevelopment area permitted theaters, cinemas, culinary schools, dance 
studios, theater workshops, and fashion design schools.119 Other secondary 
uses included restaurants, bars and clubs, and specialty retail stores.120 
 
 111. Id. 
112. Id. 
 113. Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 
253, 257 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. (noting that the “proposed use [was] not a permitted use in the Zone” 
and “would require prior approvals from the Zoning Board of Adjustment”). 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 258. 
 118. Id. 
119. Id. 
120. Id. 
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However, churches, schools, or government buildings were not permitted 
uses, and the design guidelines of the plan specifically prohibited any uses 
that were not specifically listed.121  
Lighthouse requested a waiver from the zoning board specifying 
they wanted to use the property for church functions, including prayer, 
pastoral residence, church offices, and a religious gift shop.122 The wavier 
was not approved, and Lighthouse appealed the board’s decision to the 
Long Branch City Council, but was once again denied.123 The City Council 
reasoned that a church would “destroy the ability of the block to be used as 
a high end entertainment and recreation area due to a New Jersey statute 
which prohibits the issuance of liquor licenses within two hundred feet of a 
house of worship.”124 The City Council essentially reasoned that 
Lighthouse would have a negative impact on the economic revitalization of 
the new plan because permitting a storefront church would “jeopardize the 
development of the Broadway area, which was envisioned as ‘an 
entertainment/commercial zone with businesses for profit.’”125  
After being denied twice, Lighthouse filed an amended complaint 
claiming that the new redevelopment plan violated the Free Exercise Clause 
and RLUIPA.126 The district court granted Long Branch’s motion for 
summary judgment, and the Third Circuit affirmed the order.127 The Third 
Circuit divided its analysis into pre-amendments to the plan and post-
amendment to the redevelopment plan.128 The Third Circuit explained that 
the RLUIPA equal terms section included neither a substantial burden nor 
a strict scrutiny requirement.129 Rather, the Third Circuit agreed with the 
district court when it held that a land use regulation violates the equal terms 
provision of RLUIPA only if it treats religious assemblies or institutions 
“less well” than nonreligious assemblies or institutions that are similarly 
situated with respect to the regulatory purpose.130  
First, applying this analysis to the redevelopment plan, the court 
held that the plan did not violate the equal terms provision because churches 
are not similarly situated to the other allowed assemblies with respect to the 
goals of the plan where, based off the state statute, churches would hamper 
 
121. Id. 





 127. Id. at 277. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 270. 
 130. Id. at 266 
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Long Branch’s ability to “achieve redevelopment of an underdeveloped and 
underutilized segment of the City.”131 The Long Branch ordinance, on the 
other hand, did violate the equal terms provision.132 Because the ordinance 
permitted a range of different uses in the Central Commercial District, 
while simultaneously excluding churches, the city treated Lighthouse on 
less than equal terms with the non-religious assemblies that caused similar 
harm to the regulatory purpose of the district.133 The court ruled that this 
violated the equal terms provisions because the ordinance’s goals were not 
documented, and so it was unclear as to what the city’s objectives were for 
the district.134 Also, the ordinance violated the equal terms provision 
because the ordinance did not clarify “why a church would cause greater 
harm to the regulatory objectives than an ‘assembly hall’ that could be used 
for unspecified meetings.”135 
The Third Circuit based its reasoning on why it adopted the 
similarly situated argument on the fact that Congress intended to codify the 
Supreme Court’s existing jurisprudence interpreting RLUIPA’s Free 
Exercise Clause.136 The court explained that the impact of certain secular 
behaviors but not certain religious behaviors “must be examined in light of 
the purpose of the regulation.”137 Further, “when a government permits 
exemptions to an otherwise generally applicable government regulation, the 
Free Exercise Clause requires that the government accord equal treatment 
to religion-based claims for exemptions that would have a similar impact 
on the protected interest.”138 The court rejected the Eleventh Circuit’s 
expansive reading on the equal terms provision, explaining that the 
Eleventh Circuit’s reading of the statute would lead to the assumption that 
“Congress intended to force local governments to give any and all religious 
entities a free pass to locate wherever any secular institution or assembly is 
allowed.”139  
 
C. The Seventh Circuit 
 
Initially, the Seventh Circuit followed the Eleventh Circuit’s strict 
scrutiny interpretation but, in 2010, made the decision to switch to a revised 
 
 131. Id. at 270. 
 132. Id. at 272. 
133. Id. at 272-73. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 272. 
 136. Id. at 264. 
 137. Id. at 265. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 268. 
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version of the Third Circuit’s similarly situated requirement.140 The 
Seventh Circuit’s resolution was to switch the focus from the “regulatory 
purpose” language from the Third Circuit test and replace it with “accepted 
zoning criteria.”141 So, instead of requiring the secular comparator to be 
similarly situated with respect to a regulatory purpose, it must be similarly 
situated with respect to an accepted zoning criterion.142 The court explained 
that “purpose” was subjective and “regulatory criteria” was objective and 
was thus less susceptible to manipulation.143  
In River of Life, a small church wanted to relocate to a building in 
the Village of Hazel Crest.144 The building where the church wanted to 
relocate was not only located in a dilapidated part of town, but was also 
zoned as a commercial district that excluded any new noncommercial uses 
in order to revitalize the commercial district in that area.145 The zoned 
commercial district excluded new noncommercial uses from the district 
including churches, community centers, schools, and galleries.146 When the 
city denied the church’s attempts to relocate in the district, the church 
sued.147 The Seventh Circuit held that the city did not violate RLUIPA 
because the church was excluded from a “commercial zone” in accordance 
with all other non-commercial uses in relation to “an accepted zoning 
criteria.”148  
Judge Posner expressed reservations when considering whether or 
not to adopt the Third or Eleventh Circuit tests.149 He concluded that neither 
the Eleventh nor Third Circuit approach would be followed in his 
decision.150 Judge Posner completely dismissed the Eleventh Circuit’s test 
in Midrash Sephardi, explaining that this approach would give religious 
 
 140. River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Village of Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d 367, 
368-69 (7th Cir. 2010). The original opinion adopted the Third Circuit’s test, which in 
turn prompted an en banc rehearing to resolve the inter-circuit conflict with respect to the 
proper test for applying the equal-terms provision. 
 141. Id. at 371. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
144. Id. at 368. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 368. 
 148. Id. at 371. 
 149. Id. at 370 (noting that “[n]either the Third Circuit’s nor the Eleventh 
Circuit’s approach, though in application they might yield similar or even identical 
results—and results moreover that would strike most judges as proper—is entirely 
satisfactory”). 
 150. Id. at 368-71. 
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land use favored treatment and would violate the Establishment Clause.151 
Discussing the topic of equality, Judge Posner wrote that the equal terms 
provision fulfills its objective when it compares the city’s treatment of 
different assemblies in relation to the district’s objective and zoning 
criteria—commercial, residential, industrial, or some combination of the 
three—rather than a dictionary definition or a regulatory purpose that could 
easily be manipulated by zoning officials.152 However, the court even 
admitted that the zoning criteria test was “less than airtight,” referring to 
regulatory criteria as parking, traffic control, and generating municipal 
revenue, including “ample shopping” opportunities.153 
 
IV. FINDING A CONTINUUM TO ANALYZE THE EQUAL TERMS PROVISION 
ON 
 
A. Putting Things in Perspective 
 
As the circuits have split over exactly how to apply the equal terms 
provision in RLUIPA, the tests they have chosen to guide their 
interpretations have proven to weigh the economic considerations 
differently. It is obvious that the courts have been unable to follow a 
consistent framework in interpreting the equal terms provision. The courts 
have established that there are different ways of dealing with the problem 
between religious institutions and city officials in the zoning context in 
terms of how the equal terms provision is interpreted as it relates to 
commercial districts. This creates the question of what has driven the courts 
to different conclusions and why. In other words, are some jurisdictions 
giving the equal terms provision a reading that seems consistent with the 
text and still preserves some right for religious assembly or institutions in 
that area? Or are the courts leaning too far in favor of commercial uses and 
thus in favor of the city and its zoning officials?  
Nevertheless, as discussed above, cities and towns often have a 
vested interest in keeping out churches that might undermine their own 
economic developments that provide them some type of benefit that a 
religious institution might otherwise not provide. Where cities maintain 
such an interest, it is not likely that they will be willing to strike a fair 
balance between religious interests and their own, and these views are 
illustrated in the circuit court decisions discussed about in this Article. In 
such situations, it becomes increasingly muddled and confusing to 
 
151. Id. at 368-70. 
 152. Id. 
153. Id. at 373-74. 
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determine if RLUIPA can even establish some balance of power between 
municipalities and religious institutions or if it just further muddies the 
exercise of religious freedom waters.  
 
A. A Continuum of Interpretations on Equal Terms 
 
1. The Eleventh Circuit 
 
The Eleventh Circuit’s cases have considered non-religious 
assemblies when evaluating equal terms violations. This means that the 
economic considerations given in instances such as in the Third and 
Seventh Circuits are not always successful. In Midrash Sephardi,154 the 
Eleventh Circuit interprets the provision textually, finding a violation when 
a city treats any type of religious land use with any type of assembly on less 
than equal terms.155 The court in Midrash Sephardi found a violation of 
RLUIPA because non-religious assemblies—private clubs—were 
permitted where religious institutions were not.156 
The court also declined to adopt the “similarly situated” 
requirement reasoning that it has the “feel” of an equal protection law, but 
the text lacks the similarly situated requirement usually found in the equal 
protection analysis.157 With respect to the Third and Seventh Circuits that 
adopted the similarly situated requirement, the economic rationales 
presented by the cities proved to be the more successful argument for the 
cities, as noted by Judge Sykes in her dissent in River of Life.158 So, it would 
appear that the Eleventh Circuit approach is more protective of religious 
liberty because its reading of the equal terms provision is consistent with 
the actual text of the provision in preserving the right for religious 
institutions in that area.  
 
2. The Third and Seventh Circuits 
 
Like the Seventh Circuit, the Third Circuit also required a “similarly 
situated” comparator in order to find an equal terms violation. The plaintiff 
must show that the religious assembly and secular assemblies “are similarly 
 
154. The Eleventh Circuit explained that the equal terms provision “lacks the 
similarly situated requirement usually found in equal protection analysis.” Midrash 
Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1229-35 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 155. Id. at 1232. 
 156. Id. at 1231. 
 157. Id. at 1229. 
 158. River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Village of Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d 367, 
386 (7th Cir. 2010). 
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situated as to the regulatory purpose” of the ordinance.159 This means that 
a city can exclude religious institutions and allow a movie theater, gym, or 
bar, so long as the exclusion of the religious institutes serves a legitimate 
regulatory purpose—such as something that would increase economic 
revenue for the city.160 This “similarly situated” reading enables a 
personalized discretionary organization of land-use regulation, and 
subsequently, the potential for pretextual discrimination. This type of 
discrimination was specifically what Congress was trying to eliminate 
when it enacted RLUIPA. 
The Third Circuit believed that a broad textual interpretation, like 
the Eleventh Circuit’s, interfered with local economic development. The 
court explained that the impact of the behaviors, those that are both allowed 
and forbidden, were to be examined in light of the purpose of the regulation. 
The court declared that the proper comparison was between a religious 
assembly and a similar secular assembly that similarly impact a regulation’s 
aims.161 This standard, combined with the amount of discretion that city 
officials have in the zoning context, further encourages city officials to 
propose economic rationales as to why they zone out religious institutions. 
Using this discretionary authority further supports the likelihood that their 
claims will be successful. This standard also seems nonsensical because it 
has the ability to weigh commercial interests higher than religious liberty, 
leaving religious institutions nowhere to go.  
 
3. Coming to a Consensus? 
 
It is difficult to understand how the Third and Seventh Circuits are 
reconciling the purposes of RLUIPA, and the Third Circuit’s “regulatory 
purpose” requirement even appears to raise more questions than it does 
answers. The court never explains exactly how to determine what an 
ordinance’s regulatory purpose actually is. As Professor Douglas Laycock 
points out, there are several possible approaches to determining an 
ordinance’s regulatory purpose.162 The court could look for statements of 
purpose in the ordinance itself,163 but these are often absent.164 Or, the court 
could look for an “objective” purpose by considering how the zoning code 
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operates and the other types of uses that it allows.165 However, this inquiry 
is extremely flexible and easily manipulated by city officials.166 The issue 
is that RLUIPA’s equal provisions clause does not answer the question of 
what a regulatory purpose is. The only question required to ask, according 
to the equal terms provision, is whether or not the same rules are applied to 
both religious and non-religious assemblies.  
The Seventh Circuit’s “accepted zoning criteria” test does not 
appear to resolve any of the Third Circuit’s problems either. Instead, the 
Seventh Circuit was left with the task of trying to figure out what “accepted 
zoning criteria” was, which was essentially the same problem that the Third 
Circuit had initially created for themselves. Other than parking and traffic, 
the court did not clarify what fell under the accepted zoning criteria.167 
Additionally, the “regulatory purpose” and “accepted zoning criteria” tests 
make it easy to bypass the equal terms clause in RLUIPA altogether. Cities 
can always justify the exclusion of religious institutions with economic 
rationales. This standard motivates city officials to invoke economic 
rationales because they know that these rationales are more than likely to 
weigh in their favor when compared to religious institutions. A city merely 
has to say that a religious institution would not generate revenue because 
they are tax exempt, and this would be enough for the Third and Seventh 
Circuits. This result would almost always guarantee the exclusion of 
religious assemblies.  
The “similarly situated” test does not align with the text or purpose 
of RLUIPA. If Congress had intended for there to be a “similarly situated” 
requirement, they could have easily included it into the equal terms 
provision. But the equal terms provision was enacted as a “flat-objective 
rule.”168 Furthermore, the Seventh and Third Circuit approaches are not 
consistent with the purposes of protecting religious freedom. The courts 
have developed a restricted interpretation of the equal terms provision and 
added additional language that further complicates and convolutes the 
meaning of the provision into what should have been a straightforward rule 
that Congress originally intended it to be. This reading allows for a high 
likelihood of discrimination with the ability to use economic revitalization 
as pretext to excluding churches. The way that the courts chose to handle 
these situations proved that they weighed in favor of zoning out religious 
institutions in favor of economic development 
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On the other hand, some unintended consequences have resulted 
due to the enactment of RLUIPA. RLUIPA was enacted because there was 
a need for a sense of uniformity and clarity in the protection of free exercise 
of religion that extended to religious institutions and assemblies. However, 
the opposite seems to have occurred. Rather than resolving the area of 
conflict between the city officials and religious institutions, the statute has 
essentially created a new area of conflict amongst the courts in determining 
how to interpret the provisions within RLUIPA. The circuit split reveals 
that courts have yet to come to a common understanding on how best to 
handle the zoning conflict. Now, more than ever, there is a lack of 
uniformity and clarity spread across the jurisdictions on how to handle these 
issues. Based off of the courts’ decisions so far, it does not appear that they 
are going to come to a mutual understanding anytime soon. This Comment 
has sought to provide some level of coherence to the issue by pinpointing 
major trends in the way that courts have interpreted the ways to deal with 
the equal terms provision Provision within RLUIPA. Notwithstanding this 
analysis, RLUIPA has not necessarily provided courts with a consistent 
framework, but it has highlighted something that was easy to mask by 
pretext: that churches continue to be a disfavored use in the zoning context 
and their basic First Amendment rights are continuously being subjected to 




The First Amendment provides protection to religious institutions 
to allow them to practice their religion, and as such, these religious 
institutions are constitutionally required to have a place to serve and 
practice their religion. RLUIPA was enacted to combat discriminatory 
attempts by local governments to apply zoning ordinances to churches and 
other religious institutions. Over the nineteen years since its enactment, 
RLUIPA has proven its value, ensuring religious institutions the necessary 
leverage needed to provide for an individual assessment and to provide an 
even playing field in terms of the ability to demonstrate unequal treatment 
in the zoning context. The lower courts’ approaches to interpreting the 
equal terms provision are inconsistent, ranging from textual interpretations 
favoring the protection of religious liberty to sharply narrowed 
interpretations weighing the economic interests higher than those of 
religious institutions through some form of a regulatory purpose or zoning 
criteria. The key question going forward is whether or not the lower courts 
can formulate some type of continuum of interpretations consistent with 
balancing both the cities’ economic concerns in its community with the core 
200 MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW [VOL. 38:2 
 
First Amendment rights that the equal terms clause of RLUIPA provides 
for religious institutions within these municipalities.  
 
